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This paper addresses the relationship between vulnerability and 
climate change induced human population displacement. 
Anthropogenic climate change is increasingly altering the way people 
live. A significant consequence of the effects of climate change is 
human displacement due to climate effects such as hurricanes, sea 
level rise, and drought. People displaced by the effects of climate 
change suffer from a legal protection gap. Increasing global attention 
is being addressed at closing this gap. This paper explores the 
relationship between vulnerability and climate change induced 
displacement by analyzing case studies of hurricane induced 
displacement in the U.S. Gulf Coast, cyclone induced displacement in 
Bangladesh, and drought induced displacement in Somalia. Analysis 
of these case studies demonstrates that there is a relationship 
between socioeconomically vulnerable populations and displaced 
populations. Both in developed and developing countries, 
environmental displacement affects vulnerable populations 
disproportionately. Policy aimed at closing the legal protection gap 
for environmentally displaced persons should address the 
socioeconomic inequalities that make marginalized groups more 
vulnerable to climate change. 
 
Keywords: climate change, displacement, vulnerability, climate risk,  
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Author’s Note: 
I pursued this research as an opportunity to combine my studies in 
Law, Societies, Justice, and Environmental Studies in a culminating 
senior thesis. I first explored the topic of environmental displacement 
in a course on U.S. Asylum and Refugee law. After gaining an 
introduction into how migration and refugee law applies, or more 
accurately does not apply, to environmentally displaced persons, I 
decided to further research the problem and complete a senior thesis.  
  




Anthropogenic climate change is adversely affecting the 
Earth’s environment and altering the ways in which people live. 
Politicians and decision makers are addressing greater attention 
towards people displaced by the effects of climate change or who will 
be displaced in the future. This problem is a powerful example the 
human face of climate change in the international policy arena.1 The 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has acknowledged 
that the effects of climate change have forced people to leave their 
homes in search of new lives in new places, and states that the 
UNHCR will work on human rights issues relating to climate change 
induced population displacement and adapt much of its 
environment-related planning and work to address the effects of 
climate change.2 The UNHCR has expressed concern, however, 
because environmentally displaced persons (EDPs), are not covered 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention and are therefore not protected by 
the UNHCR’s charter. The media and politicians often refer to EDPs 
as 'climate refugees,' however there is not a consensus among 
politicians, international institutions, or academics that EDPs 
necessarily refugees due to their legal ambiguity. This lack of 
consensus has created a legal protection gap. 
Environmental displacement is not solely an ecological 
problem. It is a multicausal problem where ecological and 
socioeconomic vulnerability act together to displace marginalized 
people. Professor of Geography Steve Lonergan noted in 1998: 
there is too often an uncritical acceptance of a direct causal link 
between environmental degradation and population displacement. 
Implicit in these writings is the belief that environmental degradation 
– as a possible cause of population displacement- can be separated 
from other social, economic or political causes. It must be recognized 
that the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially 
constructed; only through a structural understanding of the 
environment in the broader political and cultural context of a region 
or country can one begin to understand the ‘role’ it plays as a factor 
in population movement.3 
The problem with relying on a refugee framework for addressing 
EDPs is that this method risks accepting an uncritical link between 
climate change and population displacement.  
 Climate change alone does not displace people, it exacerbates 
social vulnerability which contributes to displacement. While 
addressing environmental displacement as a refugee crisis creates a 
																																								 																				
1 Koko Warner, “Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate 
2 “Climate Change,” UNHCR, accessed March 8, 2015,http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html 
3 Steve Lonergan, “The role of environmental degradation in population displacement,” Environmental Change and Security 
Project Report 4 (1998): 8. 
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sense of urgency, this framework will not adequately address the 
problem. Climate change is not the sole source of persecution that 
leads people to environmental displacement. In fact it is not a source 
of persecution at all because it does not discriminate. The impacts of 
climate change may be the reason for why people evacuate, but they 
alone do not explain why people do not return to their places of 
origin. The problem results from the complex relationship between 
climate change, lack of agency, and governance. In this paper I argue 
that socioeconomic inequality and marginalization of vulnerable 
communities account for the disparity in who is displaced by the 
effects of climate change. I will first provide a review of current 
scholarship on the issue, and then examine case studies of 
environmental displacement in the U.S. Gulf Coast, Bangladesh, and 
Somalia. Finally I will discuss the policy implications of my findings 
and argue that policies aimed at addressing the legal protection gap 
that exists for environmentally displaced people needs to address the 
underlying socioeconomic conditions of marginalization that create 
displacement by taking a human rights based approach. 
 
Categories of Climate Change Induced Displacement  
 
Environmental migration is either slow onset or rapid onset. 
In this paper I will look at slow onset environmental displacement 
and rapid onset environmental displacement from hydro-
meteorological disasters, disasters caused by water related events. 
Climate change contributes to both rapid-onset and slow-onset 
environmental displacement. Climate effects like increasing ocean 
temperatures, rising sea levels, and increasing global temperatures, 
alter the way people interact with water. Climate change threatens 
aspects of life such as living near bodies of water and relying on 
bodies of water and groundwater for livelihoods. The threats to the 
way people interact with water influence rapid onset and slow onset 
migration.   
Rapid onset environmental displacement is people displaced 
due to natural disasters such as hurricanes, cyclones, and landslides, 
which render places uninhabitable. It is associated with climate 
change because of the effect of rising ocean temperatures on ocean 
movements and storms. According to the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, “14.9 million people were displaced by sudden-
onset natural disasters in 2011” alone.4 In this paper, I will examine 
rapid-onset environmental displacement resulting from Hurricane 
Katrina in the U.S. Gulf Coast and Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh.  
Slow onset displacement involves peoples gradually forced 
out of their place of inhabitance due to factors such as drought, soil 
																																								 																				
4 Vikram Kolmannskog, “Climate Change, Environmental Displacement and International Law,” Journal of International 
Development 24 (2012): 1071.  
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erosion, and sea level rise, which make their way of life in that place 
impossible. Droughts are expected to become more frequent and 
severe due to anthropogenic climate change.5 In particular, climate 
change is expected to decrease freshwater availability and affect 
between 75 and 250 million people in Africa by 2020.6 Slow-onset 
displacement due to drought is often temporary, such as is common 
in Somalia. Slow-onset displacement in Somalia, which I will discuss 
later in this paper, is an extreme example of drought related 
migration. Migration related to drought is often multicausal; due to 
the impacts of drought combined with resulting political or economic 
crises. Slow-onset ecological events like droughts gradually 
deteriorate people’s livelihoods to the point where they cannot 
sustain an adequate standard of living in their places of origin. 
Droughts alone do not necessarily render areas inhabitable or 
dangerous to continue residing in, but they affect many aspects of life 
including economies. For this reason there is greater inclination to 
categorize slow-onset EDPs as economic migrants than there is for 
rapid onset EDPs. In this case of Somalia, and in other cases of 
drought related displacement, environmental displacement can be 
thought of as migration motivated by a tipping point.7 
 
Review of Literature  
 
Terminology 
 The term ‘climate refugee’ is frequently used in politics and 
media, yet it is met with a degree of caution in scholarship because 
people displaced due to climate change are not covered by the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to the 
convention, a refugee is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country."8 EDPs do not have the rights that the Convention and the 
UNHCR, the U.N. agency mandated to safeguard the rights of 
refugees as guaranteed by the 1951 Convention, awards to 
Convention refugees. Political scientists and environmental policy 
scholars Biermann and Boas use the term ‘climate refugee’ because it 
has strong moral connotations and gives the problem legitimacy and 
urgency.9 This understanding departs from the legal definition of a 
																																								 																				
5 Robert A. McLeman, Climate and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 141. 
6 Cecilia Tacoli, "Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a Context of High Mobility," in Population 
Dynamics and Climate Change, ed. Jose Miguel Guzman et al. (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2009), 108. 
7 Jane McAdam, "The concept of crisis migration," Forced Migration Review 45 (2014): 10.  
8 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World” Towards Global Governance System to Protect 
Climate Refugees,” Global Environmental Politics 10 (2010): 67. 
9 Ibid. 
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refugee. McAdam, a professor of refugee law, refers to the term 
‘refugee’ as “a legal term of art” confined to the definition by 
international law, and does not consider EDPs as refugees.10 Many 
scholars reject the term ‘environmental refugees’ because it assumes 
there is a direct causal link between environmental change and 
migration. The term creates an oversimplified view of the problem, 
which is based on ‘common sense’ rather than a complex 
understanding.11 Subramanian and Urpelainen use the term 
environmentally displaced persons “so as to not confuse their rights 
with conventional refugees.”12 Kolmannskogg also uses this term, 
defining it as “those forcibly displaced at least partly because of a 
natural disaster.”13 EDP is also the UNHCR’s preferred term and I 
will be using it in this paper.14 Though imperfect, the term ‘EDP’ 
allows for considerations of climate change, human agency, and 
governance, when analyzing the multicausal nature of environmental 
displacement.  
 
Relevance and role of international law  
People fleeing regions for environmental reasons do not meet 
the strict definition of refugee from the 1951 Convention. The 
commonly used term ‘climate refugee’ is therefore flawed. However 
as McAdam notes, while the law defines ‘refugee’ in a particular way, 
this does not mean that displaced people who do not fit the 
definition are unworthy of refugee protection or even necessarily 
denied it.15 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
was a stop-gap measure implemented to address the refugees of 
WWII. The U.N. intended for it to be temporary and solve a 
temporary problem. However, the 1951 Convention and the 
following 1967 Protocol are used today to cover the world’s vast 
number of refugees fleeing persecution. The 1951 Convention alone 
cannot address the plight of EDPs first because it was written to 
address a specific problem, and second because climate change was 
not understood when the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were 
written. The principle of protection and non-refoulment – not forcing 
refugees to return to their countries of origin – should  apply to 
EDPs on moral grounds. The reasons for their displacement are 
different than those of Convention refugees, but their suffering is 
similar.   
 
																																								 																				
10 McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 97  
11 Tacoli, "Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a Context of High Mobility," 107. 
12 Narayan Subramanian and Johannes Urpelainen, “Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can 
international treaties help?,” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 14 (2013): 27. 
13 Kolmannskog, “Climate Change, Environmental Displacement and International Law,” 1072. 
14 UNHCR, "Environment and Climate Change." UNHCR The U.N. Refugee Agency. Accessed January 29, 2016. 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c10a.html. 
 
15 McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 97.  
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 Expanding the 1951 Refugee Convention  
The case could be made for the Refugee Convention to be 
reinterpreted to include EDPs. A refugee is persecuted based on 
“reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”  Accordingly, EDPs experience 
climate disasters differently based on their demographics and 
memberships in certain social groups. Politicians in ecologically 
vulnerable countries like the Maldives and Bangladesh have even 
called for the Convention to be amended to include protections for 
EDPs.16 While EDPs do not meet the strict definition of a refugee, it 
is too soon to say that EDPs will never be covered by the refugee 
definition.17 The reason for this is that displacement is not random. 
Marginalized populations that become environmentally displaced 
arguably constitute a ‘particular social group.’ Marginalized groups 
such as ethnic minorities and members of oppressed castes are both 
more exposed to climate disaster before they occur and suffer from 
inequitable distribution of relief and assistance after the disaster. This 
distinction between the general population and marginalized groups’ 
experience of climate change, which I discuss through three case 
studies in this paper, could fulfill the requirement of “reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”  
Lack of protection assistance in the aftermath of disasters is 
comparable to persecution if the assistance is unequally or inequitably 
distributed. In cases of politicized disaster relief, as was the case in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, particular social groups may be 
unable to avail themselves of state protection in the form of disaster 
relief. Sources of persecution need not be a state actor, or even 
supported by state actors, to be considered persecution under the 
Convention. Deborah Anker, Professor of Law and Director of the 
Harvard Law School Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, 
argues that persecution includes situations where the state is “simply 
unable to protect its citizens.”18 She further argues that “refugee law 
exists to provide surrogate… protection when the state has failed in 
fundamental duties it owes to its population and this failure has a 
discriminatory impact based on” Convention categories.19 Anker’s 
surrogacy principle is useful in analyzing the role of international 
refugee law for EDPs. Discriminatory climate adaptation policies and 
failure to provide adequate disaster relief can be considered as 
persecutory because the state is failing in its fundamental duties it 
owes to its population, the protection of people’s lives.   
																																								 																				
16 Jane McAdam, “Swimming against the tide: why a climate change displacement treaty is not the answer,” International 
Journal of Refugee Law 23 (2011): 6.  
17 Kolmannskog, “Climate Change, Environmental Displacement and International Law,” 1075-1076.  
18 Deborah Anker, “Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the ‘Domestic’ Sphere: the Non-State Actor 
Question.” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001): 394.  
19 Ibid, 399.  
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As discussed earlier, not all scholars reject using the term 
‘climate refugee.’ Biermann and Boas support using the term, but 
they do not support expanding the 1951 Convention to cover said 
climate refugees. They argue that the UNHCR rejects the term 
‘climate refugee’ because of the legal rights that it bestows upon 
‘refugees.’ Transboundary flight distinguishes refugees from internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). By law, refugees must be outside of their 
country of nationality. If their flight is internal, they are considered 
IDPs. Biermann and Boas disregard the transboundary flight 
requirement for refugees because climate change will cause 
transnational and internal flight. They choose to use the term refugee 
because it has “strong moral connotations of social protection... [and] 
by using this term, the protection of climate refugees will receive the 
legitimacy and urgency it deserves.”20 They define climate refugees as 
“people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near 
future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural 
environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate 
change: sea level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water 
scarcity.”21 One argument against expanding the Convention’s 
mandate to cover people under Biermann and Boas’ definition is that 
it would extend Convention protections to a group 20 times larger 
than what is currently covered. This could produce a trade-off 
between the legal protection of climate refugees and the protective 
services currently awarded to Convention refugees. Another 
argument is that climate refugees require a different kind of 
protection than Convention refugees because most will remain in 
their home countries. 22 Rather than expanding the Convention, 
Biermann and Boas propose establishing a new regime for governing 
climate refugees, with an emphasis on resettlement, collective rights, 
and international assistance and burden sharing.23 They suggest this 
regime could take the form of a protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.2425  The UN 
Development Programme and the World Bank could serve as 
implementing agencies.26 Biermann and Boas acknowledge that the 
proposed governance system would have to overcome practical and 
political hurdles. An obvious hurdle is the emphasis on international 
assistance and burden sharing based on grant funding, which creates 
																																								 																				
20 Biermann and Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World” Towards Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees,” 66-67. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid, 74.  
23 Ibid, 79. 
24 Ibid, 75-76.  
25 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement,( FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1) 2015. 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf 
26 Biermann and Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World” Towards Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees,” 79.  
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a financial burden for donor countries. However, they argue that 
attitudes of self-interest may, or may have to, change.27  
In some cases, new contextual interpretations of the Refugee 
Convention could be useful in addressing the problem of 
environmentally displaced persons. However, as supported by both 
McAdam and Biermann and Boas, the Convention alone cannot 
address the problem because it was not designed to address this issue. 
The majority of environmental displacement cases do not meet its 
criteria. Limiting the understanding of EDPs as ‘refugees’ lessens the 
severity of the problem by limiting it to a framework with which it is 
not wholly compatible.  
  
 Internal displacement protocols 
Another reason that the Refugee Convention is not the most 
appropriate legal mechanism for addressing EDPs is that they are 
predominantly internally displaced, meaning they are displaced within 
their countries of origin. Kolmannskogg suggests that the 1998 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which incorporate 
aspects of international refugee law, provide a useful framework for 
addressing environmental displacement. The Guiding Principles 
contain a broad definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
“which includes those fleeing man-made or natural disasters.” The 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons has further clarified that the definition covers EDPs. The 
Guiding Principles are a soft law mechanism that are increasingly 
being incorporated into national laws and policies. Soft law is legal 
agreements and understandings that are non-binding. Its biggest 
advantage is its flexibility.28 Soft law is often associated with 
international law, as most U.S. Resolutions and Declarations fall 
under it. States are not bound by soft law provisions, but there is a 
legal expectation that they abide by them and use them to guide 
domestic policy. Soft law is especially relevant when discussing the 
impacts of climate change, as it is still a developing field of science 
and policy, and non-binding law may be temporarily more 
appropriate. However, because they are non-binding, there is also 
very limited enforceability and accountability with soft law 
mechanisms.  
 
 Regional regimes  
 Subramanian and Urpelainen use a game theory analysis to 
study when regional collaboration in the form of environmental 
displacement treaties is feasible to address cross-border displacement 
caused by environmental degradation.29 Game theory analyses allow 
																																								 																				
27 Ibid, 83. 
28 Kolmannskog, “Climate Change, Environmental Displacement and International Law,” 1072-1073.  
29 Subramanian and Urpelainen, “Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties 
help?,” 25. 
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us to see under what quantifiable conditions two states will 
cooperate. The study finds that treaty formation is easier under 
conditions of mutual vulnerability.30 Countries are more likely to 
agree to a cross-border displacement treaty with each other when 
each is somewhat equally vulnerable. This is because they have 
similar assets and securities to lose or gain from a treaty.  
Subramanian and Urpelainen analyze different variables to 
determine if two countries will agree on treaty participation. 
Participation involves a commitment to assisting EDPs from other 
countries. The analysis shows that countries join displacement 
treaties only if they expect the benefits of assistance from 
participatory states to outweigh the costs of offering assistance to 
other states. For this reason, treaty formation is easier when countries 
are similarly situated in terms of vulnerability to climate change. 
Subramanian and Urpelainen support regional treaties because 
mutual vulnerability is more likely in geographic regions.31 Global 
treaties are unlikely to get support from low vulnerability countries 
that would have to take on a greater financial burden.  
Though environmental displacement is primarily internal, 
cross-border displacement can be expected in low-lying island 
nations and in border areas.32 Cross-border environmental 
displacement is already happening in countries like Somalia, where 
slow-onset environmental disasters are gradually driving people out 
of the country. Researching theories on cross-border environmental 
displacement is important for governments to consider when 
cooperation can be in a state’s interests.  
Subramanian and Urpelainen cite the Kampala Convention as 
an example treaty that supports their model. The Kampala 
Convention is a treaty adopted by the African Union that covers a 
wide range of cases for displacement including those “due to natural 
or human made disasters, including climate change.”33 The treaty 
includes measures to prevent internal displacement and mitigate its 
root causes. It also calls for assistance by humanitarian agencies and 
other relevant actors when a state is unable to provide sufficient 
protection. Subramanian and Urpelainen interpret ‘other relevant 
actors’ to include other state parties.34 The Kampala Convention 
supports their model as all 24 countries that have ratified the 
Convention are above median vulnerability when country 
vulnerability is quantified.35 A regional treaty can therefore serve as 
collective insurance against the threat of environmental 
																																								 																				
30 Subramanian and Urpelainen, “Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties 
help?,” 25. 
31 Ibid, 26-27.  
32 Ibid, 26. 
33 Ibid, 37. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid, 38.  
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displacement.36 While their model of mutual vulnerability can be 
useful in addressing EDP treaties at a regional level, it does not 
account for the fact that there is significant asymmetry in climate 
vulnerability among countries of the Global North and South.  It also 
fails to consider regional political conflict in parts of the Global 
South most vulnerable to climate change. In cases where states do 
not have the capacity to accept EDPs from neighboring states, or are 
equally affected by climate change, regional treaties may not help the 
countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. In the following 
section, I discuss the disparity in vulnerability between the Global 
North and South, using the research of Tracey Skillington, a 
sociologist whose research focuses on climate justice.   
 
Legal violence and environmental colonialism  
 Skillington considers the lack of legal protection for EDPs as 
a form of “legal violence.” She comes at the issue from a perspective 
of morality and human rights, and argues that the protection gap that 
exists for EDPs violates expectations of universal human rights law 
and the principles of cooperation upon which the human rights 
community is founded. In discussing the vulnerability differences 
between sending and receiving states, Skillington argues that most 
receiving states hold a significant responsibility for causing 
displacement due to the Global North’s history of carbon pollution. 37 
The industrialization of the Global North contributed immensely to 
global climate change, the results of which are most severely 
experienced by the Global South. Yet, Global North states shape 
responses that deny safe haven to EDPs. This denial amounts to legal 
violence as in many ways Global North states are denying protection 
to people harmed by their actions. Due to the temporal separation 
between the Global North’s industrialization and the effects of 
climate change experienced by the Global South, culpability of the 
Global North is lessened, and denying safe haven can be seen as a 
right of sovereignty instead of legal violence. In the following section 
I will discuss an example where the U.S. has maintained its 
sovereignty while offering some limited assistance to EDPs from the 
Global South.   
 
 Domestic legal responses 
While there is still no legal obligation based in international 
law to offer assistance to EDPs, some countries have initiated 
legislative mechanisms to offer relief to people fleeing natural 
disasters. This relief is usually in the form of temporary protection. 
The United States Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) provides 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to people from a country where 
																																								 																				
36 Ibid, 39.  
37 Tracey Skillington, “Climate justice without freedom: Assessing legal and political responses to climate change and 
forced migration.” European Journal of Social Theory 18 (2015): 290-291. 
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conditions in that country prevent nationals from returning safely.38  
Conditions include earthquakes, floods, droughts, epidemics, or other 
environmental disasters that result in a substantial but temporary 
disruption of living conditions.39 IMMACT reformed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and greatly expanded and 
revised legal immigration to the U.S.40 U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services may grant TPS to nationals of eligible countries 
who are already in the U.S.  Individuals protected under TPS are not 
removable from the U.S., can obtain employment authorization, and 
may be granted travel authorization. They also cannot be detained for 
their immigration status.41 For example, the U.S. designated 18 
month TPS to Haitians residing in the U.S. after the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake and granted TPS to almost 150,000 Nicaraguan and 
Honduran migrants who migrated after Hurricane Mitch. 42 43 The 
main benefit of temporary protection measures is that EDPs in the 
U.S. from eligible countries are protected by non-refoulment until their 
home countries are safe to return to. Unfortunately, TPS is not 
applicable for many EDPs because they are usually displaced within 
their countries of origin.  
Two key factors of TPS make it an unsuitable legal remedy 
for EDPs. First, TPS in the U.S. is highly discretionary, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security must designate a country before its 
nationals are eligible for protection. Second, TPS only benefits 
people legally or illegally already in the U.S.44 The U.S. granted TPS 
to migrants from Honduras and Nicaragua in 2003, five years after 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Most of those migrants had entered the 
U.S. illegally.45 This second requirement makes TPS a challenging and 
uncertain resource for EDPs. The theory behind temporary 
protection for individuals fleeing unsafe conditions, however, is 
promising in relation to environmental displacement. It is yet to be 
seen if TPS measures will become an encouraged legal norm as the 
effects of anthropogenic climate change intensify. 
 
																																								 																				
38 "Temporary Protected Status." U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Accessed February 05, 2016. 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 
39 Subramanian and Urpelainen, “Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties 
help?,” 27- 28. 
40 Marianne Grin and Miguel Lawson, "The Immigration Act of 1990" Harvard International Law Journal 33 (1992): 255-
257. 
41 "Temporary Protected Status." U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Accessed February 05, 2016. 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 
42 McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 182. 
43 Robert A. McLeman and Lori M. Hunter, “Migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: 
insights from analogues,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1 (2010): 451. 
44 "Temporary Protected Status." U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Accessed February 05, 2016. 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 
45 McLeman and Hunter, “Migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from 
analogues,” 451. 
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Vulnerability and Socioeconomic and Political Factors 
of Environmental Displacement 
 
EDPs are displaced due to the interplay of ecological and 
social vulnerability. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) definition of vulnerability is “the degree to which a 
system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of 
climate change, including climate variability and extremes.”46 The 
IPCC, a scientific intergovernmental body established by the U.N., 
provides an ecological definition of vulnerability based on a ‘system’s’ 
ability to cope.  The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction uses a human-based definition. Their definition of 
vulnerability is “the characteristics and circumstances of a 
community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging 
effects of a hazard.”47 Socioeconomic inequities exacerbate ecological 
vulnerability, and contribute to environmental displacement. An 
extreme environmental event becomes a disaster when it affects 
vulnerable communities.48  
Racial and class inequities can make certain groups more 
vulnerable to climate change than others due to differing levels of 
protection and resilience. Resilience is “the ability of communities to 
absorb external changes and stresses while maintaining the 
sustainability of their livelihoods.”49 Lower resilience means a 
lessened capacity to adapt. In my case studies, I find that 
marginalized groups are less resilient than dominant groups. The 
IPCC defines adaptive capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust to 
climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to 
moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to 
cope with the consequences.”50 For marginalized groups, a lessened 
capacity to adapt can lead to environmental displacement. I will use 
vulnerability indexes in my analysis of case studies to quantify 
different groups’ varying levels of vulnerability.   
 
 Vulnerability indexes 
A vulnerability index is a method of quantifying the 
vulnerability of groups, census tracts, countries, and other 
organizational units. The Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) was 
developed by the Hazards and Vulnerability Institute at the 
University of South Carolina.51 The index uses 30 U.S. Census tract 
																																								 																				
46 IPCC Climate Change. Impacts,, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment 
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variables, including race, age, median house value, immigrant 
population, and households without cars, to quantify vulnerability at 
the census tract level. The 30 variables contribute to a community’s 
ability to respond to and recover from hazards.52 The SoVI does not 
include ecological variables such as temperatures, land level above sea 
level, and level at risk for hydro-meteorological events. This allows 
for the comparison of the SoVI with individual ecological variables.    
Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping of 
vulnerability indexes provide a useful tool for analyzing the overlap 
of ecological and social vulnerability. GIS visually presents data in 
maps. A study by Martinich et al., a climate scientist at the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, combined the SoVI with a sea 
level rise coastal property model to determine if and where socially 
vulnerable population groups would experience disproportionate 
effects and burdens of adaptation to climate change induced sea level 
rise. They examined census tracts along the continuous U.S. 
coastline.53 The study found that 22 percent of the population at risk 
of sea level rise is in the highest and second highest social 
vulnerability categories. Their analysis is that “socially vulnerable 
populations would be more likely to have fewer resources within 
their communities” to respond to the risk of sea level rise.54 I argue 
that marginalized populations are more vulnerable to climate change 
because of discriminatory zoning practices and property value based 
protection decisions. This holds true in the U.S. and in developing 
countries.  
Because data is less available for population areas in 
developing nations, I use the Wheeler Vulnerability Index (WVI), an 
index of the vulnerability of countries as a whole, to quantify 
vulnerability outside of the U.S. The WVI, created by environmental 
economist David Wheeler, considers the three main impacts of 
climate change (extreme weather changes, sea level rise, and 
agricultural productivity loss) and relevant political and economic 
factors.55 Country indexes are useful for analyzing which countries 
may contribute higher numbers of environmentally displaced 
persons. Their main shortcoming, however, is that vulnerability can 
greatly vary for different populations and regions within a country. 
This is due to variance in geographic and social vulnerability of 
groups. For example in Bangladesh, rural communities on the 
southern coast of the country are much more vulnerable than the 
capital city of Dhaka. While indexes based on subnational population 
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areas such as U.S. census tracts reveal these differences, this 
information is less available in developing countries. Additionally 
even if it is available, census variables are not uniform across 
countries. Without a uniform list of variables, one index could not be 
used for different countries.  The WVI shows us that Bangladesh and 
Somalia are vulnerable to climate change. I use qualitative research of 
population shifts and demographics to analyze socioeconomic and 
ecological differences of social groups within each country. 
 
 Coastal vulnerability and disaster relief 
 By examining the impact of hydro-meteorological disasters, I 
show that discrimination trends in spatial vulnerability manifest 
similarly in developed and developing countries. Hydro-
meteorological disasters like hurricanes can cause mass destruction to 
homes and infrastructure. Research shows that lower social classes 
often suffer disproportionate levels of population displacement. 
Hurricane Mitch struck Central America in 1998 and displaced about 
2 million people. Decades of civil conflict in the region left large 
populations of people impoverished and occupying marginal and 
hazardous lands in the countryside and peripheral urban slums.”56 
People occupying these areas were considered vulnerable 
communities because of land characteristics like steep slopes prone to 
landslides and low-lying flood prone areas. Over a year after the 
storm, people continued to live in temporary dwellings around urban 
centers in Honduras, and migration out of the country after the 
hurricane tripled.57 The underlying spatial inequities beforehand and 
population displacement after Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf 
Coast were very similar to the narrative of Hurricane Mitch. In New 
Orleans, marginalized populations did not live in vulnerable areas 
because of a civil conflict, but rather because of a history of racial 
segregation and redlining. Segregation laws in post-slavery New 
Orleans forced African Americans to live in low-lying areas like the 
Lower Ninth Ward, which put them at higher risk of flooding. The 
areas of New Orleans most at risk of flooding continued to be 
primarily inhabited by people of color in 2005 when Hurricane 
Katrina struck the Gulf Coast.58 The hurricane displaced over 
378,000 people and its 2008 population was 72 percent of its pre-
hurricane population. Environmental justice scholars Bob Bullard 
and Beverly Wright note that the hurricane more severely affected 
African American households than it did white households.59 African 
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American and white populations were displaced at drastically 
different rates: “47 percent of African American households live 
someplace different, compared to only 19 percent of white 
households.”60 Hurricanes Mitch and Katrina demonstrate the 
importance of underlying socioeconomic inequities on migration 
following natural disasters. The migration outcomes from these two 
disasters were not random, rather particular demographic groups that 
were economically disadvantaged or marginalized were more likely to 
permanently relocate.61  
Cost-benefit analysis based hazard protection decisions also 
perpetuate and exacerbate marginalized groups’ vulnerability to 
climate change. In a cost-benefit analysis based protection decision, 
agencies or developers award resources for protection or resilience 
based on local property values. Protection in the form of beach 
nourishment or a levee would be awarded if the cost of installing the 
protective measure were less than the potential property loss without 
the measure in place.62 Areas inhabited by marginalized communities 
often have lower property values. Therefore these communities 
suffer when protection decisions are made using cost-benefit 
analyses. For example, Martinich et al. find that highly socially 
vulnerable are more likely to be abandoned than protected in 
response to sea level rise.63 These communities are abandoned 
because the cost of making them resilient is greater than the 
monetary value of lost property if a disaster strikes. In the U.S., The 
Army Corps of Engineers, a federal agency under the Department of 
Defense, plans and constructs most adaptive infrastructure. The 
responsibility for flood protection primarily falls with the Corps. The 
Corps requires cost benefit analyses to support or justify coastal 
infrastructure and nourishment projects. Where the cost of 
protection exceeds the benefit, abandonment is the estimated 
response.64 This demonstrates how reliance on cost benefit analyses 
creates situations of environmentally displaced persons. People living 
in areas with lower property values, due to various inequities and 
historical injustices, are less likely to be protected in the face of a 
natural disaster. Though cost-benefit analyses can be useful, they 
should not be the primary method for making protection decisions.  
The connection demonstrated above, between social and 
ecological vulnerability, reflects how a lack of social power influences 
population groups’ ability to adapt to climate change and the 
likelihood of them being forced to migrate. In governance systems 
reliant on cost-benefit analyses for protection decisions, marginalized 
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populations do not have the resources to protect their communities. 
Social hierarchies and oppression also keep marginalized groups 
ecologically vulnerable. In the aftermath of cyclone Aila in 2009, the 
location of support service in rural Bangladesh depended on the rural 
power structure and the influence of rural leaders.”65 In rural villages 
in Bangladesh, families voluntarily organized into mutual benefit 
associations. Leaders of these associations, known as matabdars, 
settled village disputes between associations. The social position of 
these associations and matabdars, based on factors such as income, 
literacy, and housing, had a significant influence on the location of 
cyclone relief services.66 Marginalized groups lower in the rural power 
structure – those  most landless and impoverished – did  not have the 
social capital to acquire adequate disaster relief assistance.  A lack of 
fair governance allows government agencies to make inequitable 
protection. 
  
 Vulnerability and governance 
Effective governance can make a difference in whether a 
situation results in forced displacement or adaptive migration.  This is 
because the effectiveness and equity of governance can determine 
whether migrants will return to their places of origin, or whether they 
will migrate and not return. In the immediate aftermath of rapid-
onset events, people are able to return to their origins based on the 
effectiveness of governance to recover restore social, economic, and 
physical characteristics of the affected area.67 McLeman claims a key 
lesson from Hurricane Katrina is that damage to housing and 
competency of institutional authorities to provide relief and recovery 
are key determinants of whether people return or migrate elsewhere.68 
Both of these are associated with disproportionate levels of 
vulnerability and the role of government.  
I build off the ideas presented by McLeman, Bullard, and 
Mallick in my discussion of the relationship between environmental 
displacement and socioeconomic vulnerability.  In the following 
section, I will discuss how local governance had weak efficacy in 
recovering social, economic, and physical characteristics in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Cyclone Aila in 
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Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
 Hurricane Katrina hit the United States Gulf Coast in 2005 
and resulted in the evacuation or displacement of approximately 1 
million people.69 Many have termed the disastrous situation in New 
Orleans following the hurricane ‘unnatural’ or ‘man-made.’70 When 
New Orleans’ levees failed, 80 percent of the city was flooded. 
Although evacuation rates from New Orleans do not vary greatly 
across demographic groups, the probability of returning varies 
significantly by demographic group. 71 More than a million people in 
the Gulf Coast were displaced, 600,000 of which remained displaced 
a month after the storm. A year after the hurricane, the city was at 
half its previous population. Since then it has been rising; the 2014 
population was 79 percent of the 2000 population.72  
  
 Local vulnerability 
The city of New Orleans is situated in the very ecologically 
vulnerable Mississippi River delta. McLeman describes the city before 
the hurricane as “three shallow bowls holding a half million people at 
or below sea level.” A series of hurricanes in the twentieth century 
motivated the government to invest in protective levees to reduce the 
risk of storm flooding in the city.73 The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers used a cost benefit analysis based on property values in the 
levee project plan. The environmental impact statement for the 
project issued in 1984 states that the Corps 1974 and the final 
statement was issued and approved in 1984. The statement calculated 
annual benefits as the difference between the expected costs of 
damage caused by hurricanes without the proposed projects and the 
expected costs with the projects. 74 Adaptation and investment 
decisions based on property values instead of population density 
resulted in inequitable levels of adaptation and increased ecological 
vulnerability for more socioeconomically disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. Consistent with the Corps’ method for adaptation 
decision-making in the U.S., Martninch et al. found that when land 
value is higher than the cost of protection, the land will be protected 
through adaptive infrastructure. When the value of land is lower than 
the cost of protection, evacuation and abandonment will be the 
primary response to coastal threats. 75 The study’s use of GIS 
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highlights where land that is likely to be unprotected or abandoned 
overlaps with a high social vulnerability index. They find that the 
Gulf Coast is the region in the U.S. with greatest intersection of 
population tracts with high social vulnerability and sea level rise risk. 
New Orleans’ hardest hit neighborhood was the 
predominantly African American Lower Ninth Ward. The city has a 
racially discriminatory historical geography, which concentrates black 
populations in ecologically vulnerable zones. After the Civil War, the 
rapidly growing numbers of African Americans in New Orleans were 
legally forced to live in low-lying areas such as the Lower Ninth 
Ward, which put them at greater risk of flooding and contamination. 
African Americans were redlined into low-lying land uninhabited by 
white people.76 The effect of this redlining remains in place into 
present day. At the time of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the low-lying 
areas were most at risk of flooding; New Orleans East, Lower Ninth 
Ward, and Gentilly, were primarily inhabited by people of color.77 A 
history of racial discrimination placed minority New Orleans 
residents in a more ecologically vulnerable position than white 
residents.  
  
 Who did not return?  
Analysis of racial differences in return rates suggests racially 
correlated ecological vulnerability and social capital. Within three 
months of the hurricane, half of white residents who had evacuated 
had returned to the city. Yet over a year after the hurricane less than 
half of black residents had returned.78 Furthermore, only 38 percent 
of black evacuees from the entire affected Gulf Coast returned to 
their pre-Katrina counties, compared with 76 percent of white 
evacuees.79 These racial differences in the pre and post Katrina 
populations remain significant ten years after the storm. According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, there are now 99,650 fewer African 
Americans living in New Orleans and 11,494 fewer whites. The 
predominantly African American Lower Ninth Ward saw only 9.9 
percent of its population return. Comparatively, affluent and 
predominantly white neighborhoods repopulated back to their 
previous populations, and some grew more populated than previous 
levels For example, the predominantly white neighborhoods of 
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Garden District, the French Quarter, and Faubourg Marigny all had 
2008 populations greater than before the hurricane.80   
To be sure, return rates to different neighborhoods are 
related to levels of damage, but these too exhibit institutionally-
reinforced racialized inequalities. Damaged areas in the city “were 
populated by 46 percent African Americans compared to 26 percent 
African Americans in the rest of the city.”81 The disparity in damage 
is related to ecologically discriminatory redlining of African American 
populations described above, and to the lack of adequate investment 
and protection in ecologically vulnerable areas with low property 
values.  
Another factor in why affluent residents returned at a higher 
rate than low-income residents is homeownership and flood 
insurance. Groen and Polivka consider homeownership as “location-
specific capital,” an indicator of likeliness to return. Their analysis of 
the U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey following 
Hurricane Katrina finds that returnees were disproportionately 
homeowners compared with non-returnees.82 However 
homeownership alone is not a strong indicator of whether people 
returned home. A comparison of the repopulation of two 
neighborhoods in Orleans Parish, the Lower Ninth Ward and the 
Garden District, reveals why homeownership is not a strong 
indicator.  
The Lower Ninth Ward and the Garden District repopulated 
at very different rates. Based on U.S. Census data, the neighborhoods 
had similar homeownership rates but very different demographics. In 
2010, 59 percent of housing units in the Lower Ninth Ward and 49.1 
percent of housing units in the Garden District were owner occupied. 
The Lower Ninth Ward’s number of total occupied housing units in 
2000 was 4,820 and in 2010 was 1,061. The Garden District’s number 
of total occupied housing units in 2000 was 1,117 and in 2010 was 
1,063. Though the Lower Ninth Ward had a higher rate of 
homeownership than the Garden District, it repopulated at a much 
lower rate. The two neighborhoods had, and still have, contrasting 
race and income demographics. In 2000, the Lower Ninth Ward had 
an average household income of $37,803 and was 98.3 percent 
African American. The Garden District had an average household 
income of $124,688 and was 89.2 percent white.  
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Owning flood insurance made it much easier for people to 
return to their homes in New Orleans. Homeowners with flood 
insurance could expect relatively quick and fair settlements to begin 
funding housing recovery. There is a positive correlation with 
household income and possessing flood insurance. The majority 
Lower Ninth Ward residents were low income and did not have 
flood insurance. The Louisiana Recovery Authority’s The Road 
Home program was a grant program intended to provide funds to 
rebuild uninsured and underinsured homeowners.83 Though the 
program was intended to compensate for the socioeconomic 
differences in flood insurance protection, its implementation was 
slow and ineffective due to numerous administrative obstacles, and it 
ultimately failed in achieving its goal. 84  McLeman states two key 
lessons from Hurricane Katrina are that: 
 damage to housing is a key determinant of whether people will 
return… or migrate elsewhere [and] the competency of institutional 
authorities to provide relief and recovery assistance is an important 
influence on how people adapt, especially the poor and 
marginalized.85  
The relationship between lack of flood insurance with low-income 
people and low return rates demonstrates the importance of these 
takeaways. He also notes “strong social capital can overcome 
institutional inadequacy.” 86 Low-income people also did have access 
to social capital to improve their situation and overcome inadequacies 
of the Louisiana Recovery Authority and FEMA. Bates and Green 
argue that government program design and implementation have 
maintained the bias towards well-insured homeowners with private 
resources, to the detriment of African American homeowners in the 
Lower Ninth Ward.87 A difference in access to resources and capital 
made a big difference in who was able to return home.  
Overall, the data shows a slight positive correlation 
throughout the city of average household income of neighborhoods 
and rates of return in those neighborhoods. In Graph 1, the 
repopulation percentage of neighborhoods is the change in number 
of houses receiving mail from June 2005 and June 2015. Households 
receiving mail is a useful indicator for analyzing the number of 
occupied homes.   
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There is also a slight relationship between the racial makeup 
of neighborhoods and their repopulation rates. Graph 2 shows the 
relationship between the African American population of 
neighborhoods and neighborhood repopulation rates. Though the 
relationship is not quite a correlation, the data still shows us a racial 
difference in repopulation rates. All the neighborhoods with 
repopulation rates lower than 80 percent are predominantly African 
American and neighborhoods with lower than 60 percent 
repopulation are all over 90 percent African American.  
Racial disparities in flood insurance coverage are also relevant 
in analyzing race and repopulation. Before Hurricane Katrina, 
African Americans were the least likely racial group in New Orleans 
to have flood insurance. This is due to insurance redlining of black 
neighborhoods. Because of the disparity in insurance coverage, fewer 
settlement funds went to rebuilding homes in black neighborhoods.  
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While helpful, the data on household repopulation does not 
give us the full picture of who left and who returned to New Orleans 
because it does not take into account gentrification after Hurricane 
Katrina. Graph 3 shows the difference in New Orleans’ racial 
makeup before and after the hurricane. In 2000, New Orleans was 
66.7 percent African American and 59.6 percent in 2010.  
Additionally, adjusted for inflation in 2014 dollars, the 2000 average 
income of New Orleans was $59,354 and 2014 average income was 
$62,880.  For numerous reasons including the redlining of African 
Americans into ecologically vulnerable areas, discriminatory insurance 
practices, and a reliance on the private insurance sector to facilitate 
recovery, African Americans have returned to New Orleans at a 
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Hurricane Katrina caused the evacuation of 70 percent of 
New Orleans. Evacuees were demographically representative of the 
city. Hurricane Katrina alone does not explain why return rates were 
so different along racial and income level lines. Marginalized groups 
in New Orleans had greater levels of exposure to the hurricane and 
lesser access to economic relief and social capital after the hurricane. 
The difference in access to resources plays a significant role in the 
disparity in return rates. Though the city is repopulating, ten years 
after the hurricane, the population is still well below its previous 
population. The demographics of the city have also shifted toward a 
greater number of whites. Who returned after evacuating and who 
did not demonstrates how marginalization causes environmental 
displacement and migration in response to climate disasters.  
 
Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh   
Cyclone Aila was a category 1 climate change induced 
cyclonic storm that hit the Bangladesh coast in 2009.90 The storm 
displaced 2 million people, most of who returned to their villages 
after the cyclone. Bangladesh is one of the most, if not the most, 
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Graph 3: Comparison of 2000 and 2013 populations of African 
American, white, and Hispanic populations of Orleans Parish. 
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vulnerable country to climate change. It has a Wheeler Vulnerability 
Index score of 53 out of 100. The country is in the world’s largest 
river delta, where the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers 
converge.91 Ten percent of its land is only 1 meter above sea level, 
making it particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. The Bangladeshi 
government constructed polders and embankments in the 1960s to 
protect against inundation from the sea.92 In the 1990s, The World 
Bank funded the Bangladesh Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation 
Project, which aimed to further fortify the coast with embankments. 
These embankments, however, did not withstand the region’s 
cyclonic storms.93 Similarly to the levee breaches after Hurricane 
Katrina, Cyclone Aila toppled coastal embankments and flooded 
settlements.  
 
Local vulnerability  
Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing vulnerability of the 
southern coastal region of Bangladesh where Cyclone Aila hit. Islam 
et al. base their index of overall vulnerability on an aggregate of 
agricultural, climatic, demographic, occupational, and geographic 
vulnerability (vulnerability to hydro-meteorological disasters). They 
consider the southern districts of Bangladesh as ‘very highly 
vulnerable.’ As per Bangladesh’s 2001 Census, the country’s 19 
coastal districts had a population of 36 million people of which 52 
percent were classified as ‘poor.’94 The region’s rural poor do not 
have access to adequate relief and rehabilitation resources after 
climactic disasters. The location of disaster relief support services in 
rural Bangladesh depends on the rural power structure.95 As 
discussed previously, village associations gain power through their 
assets and income. Poor populations in rural southern Bangladesh are 
particularly vulnerable to being environmentally displaced because of 
their social vulnerability in the rural power structure and ecological 
vulnerability due to their location in the river delta.  
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Bangladeshis are socioeconomically vulnerable to climate 
change at a national level because a majority of the population relies 
on the land for a living. Sixty-three percent of the population makes a 
living in the natural resource dependent sectors of agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing.97 Though annual flooding in Bangladesh 
delivers agricultural productivity to rural areas, the rural population 
distinguishes between good floods, which nourish the land, and bad 
floods, which damage crops, housing, and shrimp ponds.98 The 
cyclone severely damaged the economy of affected areas. The 
region’s agricultural production was completely decimated, shrimp 
farms were washed away, and even personal gardens were destroyed, 
depriving most people not only of their income source, but also of 
their non-market earnings used for subsistence.99 People in this 
region had lived off the land for generations. The effects of climate 
change and lack of government protection decimated their way of 
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life. Years after Cyclone Aila, the land remains ruined and unsuitable 
for farming or living. 
 Rural Bangladesh also has ecological vulnerability trends 
similar to the redlined neighborhoods of New Orleans. According to 
Brouwer et al. the poorest and most socioeconomically marginalized 
populations in both urban and rural Bangladesh tended to occupy the 
most ecologically vulnerable regions. They found that floodplain 
residents have lower income levels than village averages. Their study 
determines that vulnerability can be determined by income 
inequality.100 101 This conclusion implies that equitable siting of homes 
can have similar levels of protecting people from climate disaster as 
physical infrastructure investments like embankments and levees. 
People in rural Bangladesh are at environmental risk because of their 
income level.  
Data on migration patterns after the cyclone shows that 
migration was both necessary and unavoidable for poorer farmers in 
the region.102 Initial migration patterns reflect that usually men would 
leave their families in the rural areas and try to find work in the 
southern cities: Khulna and Satkhira.103 This left a greater population 
of women left in the region to maintain family land and attempt to 
make a livelihood with assistance from remittances. Even before the 
cyclone, the region was very poor. The government did not devote 
resources to building climate mitigating infrastructure to protect 
people and agriculture in the region. Due to lack of sufficient 
resources, it also did not devote resources to repairing embankments 
after the cyclone to make the region suitable for agriculture again.104 
Through this policy of resource allocation, the state has failed rural 
people by failing to protect minimum living standards.  
 
Who did not return?  
Demographic trends in return rates after Cyclone Aila also 
reflect the relationship between socioeconomic status and migration.  
A survey by Mallick and Vogt of 280 households in 12 villages 
affected by Cyclone Aila shows that migration decisions correlated 
with income levels. Respondents with a pre-cyclone monthly income 
of less than $30 had an 86 percent migration rate; those earning 
between $30 and $75 had 58 percent migration rate; and those 
earning over $75 had a 19 percent migration rate.105 Another study by 
Islam and Hasan finds that 53.8 percent of Cyclone Aila migrants 
they surveyed said they left because of “damage of home and 
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cultivable lands.”106 Both studies show there is a relationship between 
housing damage, income, and the decision to migrate. In the rural 
coastal areas surveyed, low-income households were likely homes 
made of clay, which did not withstand the cyclone. Higher income 
groups lived in homes constructed of more resilient materials.107  
As in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, housing damage 
was a significant factor that kept people from returning home after 
Cyclone Aila. The storm destroyed coastal embankments, which 
submerged thousands of homes. These areas remained flooded a year 
after the storm, and 200,000 displaced people continued to live in 
temporary shelters. Around 250,000 houses were fully damaged, 
destroyed beyond repair, and about 400,000 houses were partially 
damaged. Kartiki writes that destruction of livelihood and destruction 
of household were the major reasons for migration after Cyclone 
Aila.108  
Unlike in New Orleans, the primary driver of migration from 
coastal Bangladesh was loss of livelihood due to the ecologically 
vulnerable nature of the local economy.  By damaging agriculture and 
shrimp farming, Cyclone Aila decimated the region’s source of 
income. After government and NGO relief efforts had concluded, 
there was no sustainable income generation. This motivated male 
rural to urban migration. Kartiki, Mallick and Vogt use the term 
migration instead of displacement because the majority of migrants 
were males who moved to urban areas and sent money back to their 
families.109110  Male heads of household moved to nearby urban 
centers to earn money for their families. The migration was 
environmentally caused not because the ecological destruction itself 
displaced people, but because the cyclone decimated the local income 
source, and relief efforts did not include social protection.111     
In the aftermath of Cyclone Aila, international and regional 
NGOs provided humanitarian aid such as food and water, however 
this was not sufficient protection and assistance. For EDPs of 
Cyclone Aila, there were no institutional supports from the 
government or from NGOs. EDPs lacked the assistance necessary to 
rebuild their livelihoods, both in their places of origin and in the 
places they migrated to.112 Temporary relief aid could not have 
prevented migration, but it could have facilitated supportive and 
sustainable internal migration.  
Kartiki finds that the migration from coastal Bangladesh was 
not a form of adaptation because it did not improve the overall 
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resilience of households. She considers the economic migration as an 
instinctual reaction to a climate shock. Resiliency was not improved 
for various reasons including that if migrants moved to nearby 
villages, then the local economies were not much different than their 
home economies. If they moved to urban centers, their living 
expenses substantially increased and their households did not receive 
a significant economic benefit through remittances. Additionally in 
the majority of cases, the entire household did not migrate; only one 
or two primary wage earners migrated. This means that members of 
the household remained as ecologically vulnerable as they were 
before the disaster. Kartiki attributes Bangladesh’s environmental 
migration from rural coastal villages to a lack of choice and agency.113 
Migrants do not choose to migrate in order to improve their overall 
situation; rather they are forced because they believe there is not a 
feasible alternative in their places of origin. EDPs fleeing drought in 
Somalia in 2011 faced a similar situation where they were forced to 
abandon their way of life because they found it no longer feasible.   
 
Drought in Somalia  
 Somali pastoralists are a population group considered at high 
risk of being displaced across borders by drought, and are therefore a 
relevant population to study in analyzing environmental 
displacement. Similarly to disaster migration in Bangladesh, most 
drought-related migration is temporary labor migration.114 Like other 
forms of environmental displacement, it is also multicausal, 
influenced by human decisions, and not simply the economic 
phenomenon of drought from lack of rainfall.115 Migration in Somalia 
was influenced by a lack of rainfall and existing local political violence 
that exacerbated the effects of the drought experienced by poor 
pastoral communities.  
 The majority of people in central Somalia are nomadic 
pastoralists, making their livelihoods by rearing livestock.116  
Pastoralism as a livelihood has long been a way to sustain livelihoods 
in the unpredictable environments in the Horn of Africa.117 Though 
droughts are regularly occurring natural phenomena, climate 
scientists believe droughts will intensify and increase in frequency due 
to anthropogenic climate change.118 Because they are inherently 
nomadic, it does not seem intuitive that pastoralists can be 
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environmentally displaced. However they can and are being 
displaced. According to a study by the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, pastoralists are displaced by drought when 
pastoral livelihoods reach “a critical threshold below which 
pastoralism is not sustainable.”119  Somali pastoralists reached this 
critical threshold during their 2011 drought.  
In 2011, Somalia simultaneously experienced severe drought, 
political violence, and governance failure, leading to displacement of 
a quarter of its population. The 2011 crisis in Somalia has been 
described as the 'perfect storm' due to the confluence of drought and 
governance failure.120 Accordingly, drought migration from the 
country cannot be analyzed without considering the state of political 
violence and turmoil. The drought exacerbated the turmoil and the 
turmoil exacerbated poorer pastoralists’ inability to make a livelihood. 
In response, pastoralists migrated to urban centers like Mogadishu, 
and out of Somalia to Kenya and Ethiopia.121 The case of 
environmental displacement in Somalia is unique from the other two 
cases analyzed in this paper because many people were displaced 
cross-border to Kenya and Ethiopia.122  
The multicausal nature of the crisis in 2011 influenced how 
the drought became an environmental displacement problem. A 
drought alone does not necessarily cause displacement. For example, 
regional droughts in Kenya and Ethiopia did not create famine and 
displacement, like the drought in Somalia did. The political turmoil 
and violence in Somalia left marginalized people vulnerable to famine 
and displacement.123 The case of environmental displacement in 
Somalia is also unique from the previous two case studies because of 
the role of political violence and failed governance. The UNHCR 
registers many Somalis as displaced persons. According to the 
UNHCR statistics, there were 2,059,977 displaced Somalis in 2011. In 
UNHCR records, people may only list one reason for displacement. 
The vast majority of displaced persons from this crisis do not list 
‘drought’ as the reason for their displacement. Graph 4 shows that 
from 2009-2012, the number of Somalis displaced by drought is a 
small fraction of the overall number of displaced Somalis.124 The 
number is at its highest during the 2011 drought, but even that is only 
10.6 percent of the total number displaced. Therefore despite 
frequent references to ‘drought displacement’ by politicians and the 
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media in the context of the 2011 humanitarian crisis, the 
displacement crisis had a much more nuanced cause.125  
 
 
Graph 4: Number of Somalis Displaced Annually (2009-2012) 
 
 
 Lindley, a migration professor at the University of London 
School of Oriental and African Studies, argues that the reason the 
Kenyan government, the main receiver of displaced persons from 
Somalia, explicitly distinguished between refugees displaced by 
conflict and people displaced by drought was to implicitly 
circumscribe its legal obligation under international law.126  Her 
argument is similar to the argument against referring to EDPs as 
climate refugees because the term does not allow for the 
consideration of marginalization and socioeconomic vulnerability. 
Rather, it places the blame solely on climate change. McAdam defines 
crisis migration as “a response to a complex combination of social, 
political, economic and environmental factors, which may be 
triggered by an extreme event but not caused by it.” This definition is 
an accurate term to apply to the displacement crisis in Somalia.127  
Environmental displacement in Somalia is important to study 
because of the highly vulnerable status of the country and because a 
number of refugees fleeing Somalia have listed drought as the reason 
for their displacement. However, the unstable status of the state and 
presence of political violence make it challenging to collect data on 
environmental displacement that is not influenced by political 
																																								 																				
125 Lindley, “Questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in Somalia,”41. 
126 Ibid, 41-42.  
127 McAdam, "The concept of crisis migration,"10. 
               Consilience 
   
 
133 
instability and violence. Furthermore, some scholars suggest that 
climate change can exacerbate pre-existing violence and tensions in 
climate vulnerable countries because it puts a strain on resources. 
These factors can make it difficult to study environmental migration 
in Somalia independently of forms of persecution already covered 
under the 1951 Convention.    
 
Discussion of case studies 
The environmental displacement problems in the U.S. Gulf 
Coast, coastal Bangladesh, and Somalia were all multicausal, resulting 
from a combination of climate change induced natural disasters, 
socioeconomic vulnerability, and ineffective governance. No 
movement of people can be attributed to an environmental event 
alone. It is interesting that this relationship holds true in developed 
and developing countries.  
There are similarities in vulnerability to climate change among 
marginalized groups in the U.S. Gulf Coast and in coastal 
Bangladesh. In both places, government policies placed marginalized 
populations in ecologically vulnerable areas. Poorer Bangladeshis are 
more likely to live in floodplains. Similarly, marginalized groups 
inhabited areas in New Orleans particularly vulnerable to flooding, 
like the Lower Ninth Ward. Economic and political discrimination 
concentrated both marginalized groups in these vulnerable areas. 
Another example demonstrating the many similar aspects of 
vulnerability to climate change is the structural vulnerability of 
homes. Marginalized groups in New Orleans and Bangladesh had 
homes more vulnerable to climate change because of lack of access 
to insurance and to resilient construction materials, respectively.  
The evidence I present suggests that people in developed and 
developing countries had different primary reasons for migrating or 
not returning. In the developing countries of Bangladesh and 
Somalia, inability to maintain livelihoods motivated migration. People 
left their places of origin in order to support their families. Cyclone 
Aila decimated the local land dependent economy and livelihood, 
driving people to migrate for labor opportunities to maintain their 
livelihoods. In Somalia, the drought made pastoralism, the 
predominant form of livelihood for most Somalis, no longer feasible. 
Coupled with political violence, this led to a situation of widespread 
hardship and famine in the country, forcing people to flee to internal 
displacement and refugee camps.  This form of labor migration in 
developing countries is also likely to be temporary. This is not 
necessarily the case in developed countries. In this paper I do not 
consider evacuees who returned to New Orleans after Hurricane 
Katrina as EDPs. I only consider those who left New Orleans and 
had to resettle elsewhere as EDPs. Inability to sustain livelihoods due 
to lack of labor opportunities, though somewhat relevant due to the 
temporary decline in fishing and tourism industries, was not a driver 
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of migration in New Orleans to the same extent that it was in 
Bangladesh and Somalia. I find that the lack of economic and labor 
opportunities is the main difference between environmental 
displacement in developing and developed countries.  
Evidence from the cases suggests that environmental 
displacement will likely be domestic and not international. Despite its 
proximity, there was very little migration to India from coastal 
Bangladesh after Cyclone Aila. Though Somalis were displaced cross-
border, this was likely owing to the political violence and the region’s 
history of cross-border pastoralist movement. People in New Orleans 
and Bangladesh responded to hydro-meteorological disasters with 
domestic migration. Consequently, policy responses to environmental 
displacement should focus on domestic resettlement as that is the 
more common response.  
 
Policy Implications  
 
As the impact of anthropogenic climate change becomes 
increasingly visible, governments are addressing policy to adapt to the 
changing world. Climate change mitigation cannot prevent the likely 
rise in frequency of environmental displacement. Policy aimed at 
addressing environmental displacement should not attempt at an 
‘environmental fix.’ Seeing as the problem is multicausal, policies 
addressing it must target the different layers of the problem. These 
include disparate ecological vulnerability, socioeconomic vulnerability 
and marginalization, and disparities in adaptive capacities. This 
section will not attempt to provide specific policy solutions, as these 
are beyond the scope of the paper, but rather will provide important 
considerations in creating policy solutions. Policy solutions should be 
guided by human rights not humanitarianism. Policy makers should 
take this approach by considering climate change adaptation, 
economic vulnerability, and cross-border legal responses within a 
human rights framework.  
 
Human rights approach  
EDPs are not victims of climate change in need of 
humanitarian aid. They need to be seen as humans and be treated 
with dignity. The U.N. Charter recognizes the inherent dignity and 
worth of the human person.128 This principle is further recognized by 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).129 Humanitarianism address temporary problems with 
responsive solutions, human rights address permanent problems with 
permanent pro-active solutions and policies. Anthropogenic climate 
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change has begun it course and no state or intergovernmental body 
can prevent its effects. Climate change induced displacement is 
therefore a permanent problem and requires a permanent durable 
solution.  
There is a consensus among scholars and intergovernmental 
organizations that climate change will undermine the realization of 
internationally protected human rights such as the right to health, 
food, and shelter.130 131  Furthermore, climate change will most 
severely impact those who already suffer from insufficient human 
rights protections. 132 Policy makers should address climate change 
induced displacement by targeting the inequitable enjoyment of 
human rights. They must take a human rights approach to lessen 
vulnerability to climate change before disasters and establish 
requirements for permanent and sustainable resettlement of EDPs 
after disasters.  
A human rights approach to development and decision-
making requires decision makers to focus on who has not benefitted 
from development and who has been excluded.133 My evidence 
demonstrates that EDPs are displaced due to the role of pre-existing 
conditions of inequality and vulnerability that were in place before 
natural disasters. Policy must attempt to make people less vulnerable 
by protecting their economic, social and cultural rights. Additionally, 
Kolmannskog suggests that a human rights approach is better suited 
for addressing vulnerability than a policy focused on displacement 
itself. 134 Policy that only addresses post-disaster displacement runs 
the risk of only protecting a narrowly defined group of people and 
excluding other vulnerable people.135 A human rights based is more 
valuable than narrowly defining environmental displacement or 
distributing relief aid to EDPs. States must address the underlying 
conditions of inequality and vulnerability before a natural disaster 
takes place.  
 
Adaptation and resilience 
States can lower vulnerability by improving adaptation and 
resilience.  Migration in response to an environmental event is often 
considered an extreme form of adaptation or attempt at adaptation to 
the adverse effects of climate change. Migration is a costly and 
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unfavorable endeavor, and therefore is not usually an adaptation 
method of first resort except in the most extreme circumstances.136 
Research by the World Bank finds that urban slum dwellers gain 
more from slum upgrading than from relocation. 137 This is an 
example of a particularly underserved population where costs of 
relocating are relatively low compared to costs of adaptive 
infrastructure. Increased adaptive infrastructure is more sustainable 
than relying on evacuation as a response to environmental events. 
Adaptive infrastructure creates resilience, “the ability of communities 
to absorb external changes and stresses while maintaining the 
sustainability of their livelihoods,” and is a worthy investment for 
countries most vulnerable to climate change. 138 In their discussion of 
post Cyclone Aila recovery, Mallick et al. state that improving 
physical infrastructure is the most important means of preventing 
environmental displacement in Bangladesh. 139 Physical infrastructure 
is not the only area in which governments can make improvements in 
adaptation. Proper informational networks are also an important part 
of adaptation, especially when evacuation continues to be the primary 
response to natural disasters. The dispersal of information is vital to 
disaster response and adaptation, and it is much less resource 
intensive than constructing adaptive infrastructure.  
 
Economic vulnerability 
 In both Somalia and Bangladesh, marginalized people were 
displaced because their livelihoods were dependent on ecology and 
highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This is especially 
true in developing countries where household income and 
subsistence is often closely tied with productivity of land. In rural 
areas where the majority of people’s livelihoods are dependent on 
ecology, migration is often a household strategy to diversify risk. 
Remittances that migrants send to their families in their places of 
origin play a key role in this.140 Instead of relying on this as an 
adaptation strategy, governments should consider investing in 
diversifying local economies and making them less dependent on 
vulnerable ecology. As Kartiki notes, labor migration in response to 
natural disaster does not improve the overall resilience of households. 
Relief aid will not suffice to better livelihoods and foster economic 
opportunities. A diversified economy would improve communities’ 
overall resilience to climate change by making households less 
dependent on ecologically sensitive land for their livelihoods. 
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 Policies to make vulnerable communities less economically 
vulnerable should invest in and develop industries that are not 
ecologically sensitive. There are numerous examples of foreign 
investment in Bangladesh’s shrimp farming industry because of the 
high global demand for shrimp. The U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funds a program called The Bangladesh 
Youth Employment Pilot project. This program trains youth for jobs 
or self-employment in the shrimp farming industry.141 In the context 
of environmental displacement, this is an unsustainable and 
inequitable allocation of development resources because of coastal 
Bangladesh’s high risk of hydro-meteorological disasters. To build 
communities’ resilience, job training programs for rural communities 
should focus on industries resilient to cyclones and therefore not 
dependent on the land.   
 
Cross-border responses  
 Though environmental displacement will remain primarily 
internal, states should take action to accept cross-border EDPs. I do 
not argue for expanding the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees because the convention is not a well-suited legal solution 
for the problem. The Convention is a humanitarian convention that 
addressed the temporary problem of refugees resulting from WWII. 
Though refugees today invoke the Convention today for reasons 
unrelated to WWII, they still invoke it for temporary problems like 
war and genocide.  
I do support other international legal remedies. Seventy-one 
states have signed the ICESCR and its provisions are considered 
customary international law. Article 11 of the ICESCR recognizes a 
right to an adequate standard of living, which includes food and 
housing.142 This right justifies the need for permanently resettling 
EDPs internally if possible, or internationally if the displacement is 
cross-border. A commitment to international human rights includes a 
commitment to resettling EDPs. Regional treaties, as discussed by 
Subramanian and Urpelainen, are also well-suited ways of 
approaching cross-border displacement. Countries within geographic 
regions often have similar levels of climate vulnerability, making them 
more likely to cooperate with each other and accept EDPs. Cultural 
similarities and alliances may also strengthen regional EDP treaties. 
TPS is another good example of addressing displacement from 
natural disasters. States should build upon existing TPS measures and 
consider programs that do not require TPS beneficiaries to already be 
residing in host countries. International legal remedies are unable to 
address the underlying social inequities that cause displacement, but 
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Ultimately for a policy addressing environmental 
displacement to be successful, it must address the preexisting 
conditions of inequality that make people vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change. Bob Bullard, known as the father of environmental 
justice, notes that in responding to natural disasters, “it is far easier 
for the Army Corps of Engineers to retrofit and rebuild levees than it 
is for other government agencies to root out racial injustice, 
dismantle centuries of mistrust, and rebuild ‘community.’”143 While 
environmental infrastructure projects are important, they alone will 
not necessarily make people less vulnerable to environmental 
displacement. Addressing inequality and housing discrimination are 
just as important, if not more important, as building levees. When 
looking at environmental displacement, it is clear that racial, 
economic, and social injustices are environmental problems as well. 
Due to the multicausality of environmental displacement, policy 
solutions should be holistic rather than focused on particular drivers 
of movement.144 In planning for climate adaptation, decisions makers 
should consider the bigger questions of what makes people 
vulnerable and why particular groups of people are more vulnerable 
than others. They should be guided by the principles of ‘human 
rights’ and ‘dignity’ to raise the resilience of vulnerable communities.   
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